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When is Cyber Defense a Crime? Evaluating Active 
Cyber Defense Measures Under the 
Budapest Convention 
Alexandra Van Dine  
Abstract 
 
As cyberattacks increase in frequency and intensity around the globe, private actors have 
turned to more innovative cyber defense strategies. For many, this involves considering the use of 
cutting-edge active cyber defense measures—that is, tactics beyond merely erecting firewalls and 
installing antivirus software that permit cyber defenders to detect and respond to threats in real 
time. The legality of such measures under international law is a subject of intense debate because 
of definitional uncertainty surrounding what qualifies as an “active” cyber defense measure. This 
Comment argues that active defense measures that do not rise to the level of a cybercrime are 
permissible under international law. Accordingly, it analyzes the Budapest Convention, the only 
binding international instrument related to cybercrime, and uses its definition of illegal conduct 
under international law to construct a “stoplight framework” to guide cyber defenders in their 
actions. Ultimately, this Comment concludes that cyber defenders have a “green light” to use 
purely passive measures, such as monitoring one’s own network traffic, because these measures 
are highly unlikely to involve conduct the Budapest Convention criminalizes. Active-passive 
measures, such as attaching code to intruders that tracks them back to their home base, can in 
some cases be justified under exceptions to the Convention; accordingly, cyber defenders should 
proceed with caution. Finally, outright active defense measures nearly always rise to the level of 
offense conduct under the Budapest Convention, and should not be used. This analysis provides 
needed clarity as to the legality of conduct in cyberspace, and provides cyber defenders with the 
guideposts they need to confidently innovate in today’s complex cyber landscape.  
 
                                                 
  The author would like to thank everyone involved in crafting and shaping this Comment, especially 
her faculty advisor, Professor Mary Ellen O’Connell, her editors (Osama Alkhawaja, Whittney 
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Finally, this Comment would not exist without Michael J. Assante, in whose memory this Comment 
is offered, and Page O. Stoutland, who first opened the author’s eyes to the idea of active cyber 
defense.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Imagine that you are the systems administrator at a major, multinational 
power company. Recognizing the vital role your networks play in safely delivering 
energy to consumers around the world, you are motivated to implement the most 
state-of-the-art security measures that you can afford. 
You then decide to set up a “honeypot”—a part of your system designed to 
be attractive to attackers and that no one has any legitimate motive to access. 
Soon, traffic begins to flow, and your dedicated team of cyber defenders monitors 
it. As time passes, they analyze the traffic to figure out who is intruding, carefully 
tracing it back to its source when possible. Some of the intruders have masked 
their locations by routing their activities through multiple IP addresses, and it is 
impossible to determine their identities. Those intruders are expelled from the 
system and the firewalls are updated to keep them out. 
When intruders can be identified, your defenders have followed them back 
to their own networks and have investigated those networks in order to learn more 
about who is accessing the honeypot. After gleaning as much information as 
possible, a defender shuts off the traffic flowing from that entity in order to stop 
the attack. 
Many of the tactics used in the above scenario are considered to be “active 
cyber defense” measures.1 Active cyber defense generally involves cyber defense 
and security strategies that go beyond simply erecting a firewall or installing 
antivirus software and allow cyber defenders to detect and respond to threats in 
real time.2 These tactics exist on a spectrum that spans everything from active 
network monitoring to setting cyber traps to retaliatory hacking.3 Because using 
these measures may require crossing literal territorial boundaries in cyberspace 
without a right to be there, whether and how active defense measures can be used 
at all under international law is a critical question. 
International criminal law, as it relates to cyberspace, provides a guidepost 
as to which actions are and are not permissible—even if taken in self-defense. 
Although a substantial portion of scholarship examining international law in 
cyberspace focuses on applying the laws of armed conflict, those analogs are not 
                                                 
1  See, for example, Wyatt Hoffman & Ariel (Eli) Levite, Private Sector Cyber Defense: Can Active Measures 
Help Stabilize Cyberspace?, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT’L PEACE (June 14, 2017), 
http://perma.cc/CKL9-HE5M. 
2  See, for example, CENTER FOR CYBER & HOMELAND SECURITY, GEO. WASH. U., Into the Gray Zone: 
The Private Sector and Active Defense Against Cyber Threats, 7 (2016) http://perma.cc/SAX8-
4LW3. 
3  Id. at 9. 
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useful when addressing intrusions that do not rise to the level of a “use of force.”4 
Most active cyber defense tactics do not rise to that level.5 Moreover, application 
of the state responsibility doctrine—a central component of the laws of armed 
conflict—can get very complicated, very quickly in this area. There are no soldiers 
bearing the flag of the attacking nation, only actions perpetrated by someone 
sitting behind a computer somewhere in the world, with plenty of tools at his or 
her disposal to mask his or her location and identity.6  
This Comment seeks to fill that gap by analyzing and applying international 
law related to cybercrime, as set forth in the Council of Europe’s Convention on 
Cybercrime (hereinafter “the Budapest Convention” or “the Convention”). The 
Convention is the only legally binding international instrument delineating when 
an action in cyberspace becomes a crime. By filtering the active cyber defense 
discussion through the prism of what constitutes a cybercrime under international 
law, this Comment articulates a new boundary as to which defensive actions are 
permissible in cyberspace. 
Developing a method to analyze and categorize defensive approaches in this 
fashion is critical, as the current approach to cybersecurity requires innovation. 
The frequency of successful cyberattacks—from the WannaCry ransomware 
attack that struck hospitals in the United Kingdom,7 to the massive data breach at 
the U.S. Office of Personnel Management,8 to the cyberattack against the Wolf 
Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation9—suggests that cyber defenders need to 
devise more clever defenses. It is generally recognized that attackers have the edge 
when it comes to agility and innovation,10 and defenders have long been playing 
catch-up. 
This quest to match the creativity and agility of cyberattackers has involved 
the use of active defense measures. These strategies permit defenders to detect 
and expel intruders from networks faster and might deter illegitimate access more 
effectively. This outcome is preferable for large, for-profit corporations because 
                                                 
4  See Alexandra Perloff-Giles, Transnational Cyber Offenses: Overcoming Jurisdictional Challenges, 43 YALE J. 
INT'L L. 191, 202–03 (2018). 
5   See id. at 204 (“For most transnational cyber offenses…the offense does not constitute an Article 
51 ‘armed attack’ or a ‘resort to armed force’…”). 
6  See id. at 203. 
7  See Lily Hay Newman, The Ransomware Meltdown Experts Warned Us About is Here, WIRED (May 12, 
2017, 2:03 PM), http://perma.cc/A3J5-6WKK. 
8  See Brendan I. Koerner, Inside the Cyberattack That Shocked the US Government, WIRED (Oct. 23, 2016, 
5:00 PM), http://perma.cc/Y7FY-DE5F. 
9  See Nicole Perlroth, Hackers are Targeting Nuclear Facilities, Homeland Security Dept. and F.B.I. 
Say, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2017, at B5. 
10  See Alyza Sebenius, Writing the Rules of Cyberwar, THE ATLANTIC (June 28, 2017), 
http://perma.cc/ZR8J-QR9G. 
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relying on the processes of international or domestic law to cure violations after 
the fact can be unsatisfying. The financial and reputational impacts of these attacks 
are difficult to fully remedy. Once the personal data of millions of people is leaked, 
or the power grid has been shut off, it is difficult to recover the full cost of the 
cyber incident. Empowering system administrators and operators to identify and 
address intrusions in real-time would be more effective at stopping an attack 
before these consequences occur.11 
As professionals increasingly explore active cyber defense as a solution to 
these problems, an analysis of how to do so in a way that comports with 
international law is extremely important. As it stands, “[e]ven though 
counterstrikes are currently of questionable legality, counterstrikes have already 
been occurring on the internet over the last decade, initiated by both government 
and private actors.”12 Providing guidance to those private actors is of particular 
importance, as “[t]he development of the [i]nternet is essentially market-led and 
driven by private and government initiatives” and “the private sector continues to 
play a very important role in the expansion and development of the [i]nternet.”13 
Guidance in the private sector is sorely needed, and this Comment contributes to 
that conversation. 
Section II of this Comment discusses the relevant international law related 
to cybercrime as set forth in the Budapest Convention. This Section analyzes 
activities the Convention requires signatories to criminalize that are relevant to the 
types of actions taken as part of an active defense strategy. In order to develop as 
accurate an understanding as possible, this Section draws upon guidance 
documents produced by the Council of Europe to aid in interpreting the 
Convention. 
In Section III, this Comment defines the term “active cyber defense” and 
proposes a spectrum of cyber defenses. This Comment, based on a survey of the 
active defense literature, divides this spectrum into three categories of defenses. 
First, passive measures are those that, despite their inclusion under the active 
defense umbrella, do not involve taking any external action. They are deployed 
internally on an entity’s own network. Second, there are “active” passive 
measures—defenses that may be set up and operated on an entity’s own network, 
with occasional external consequences. Finally, there are active defense measures. 
These are purely external to the network and are targeted and deployed specifically 
to end an attack or an intrusion. International law has different implications for 
each of these categories. 
                                                 
11  See Jay P. Kesan & Carol M. Hayes, Mitigative Counterstriking: Self-Defense and Deterrence in Cyberspace, 
25 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 429, 474 (2012). 
12  Id. at 475. 
13  International Telecommunications Union Res. 102, THE PLENIPOTENTIARY CONFERENCE OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS UNION (2014), http://perma.cc/TGD5-ZGE8. 
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Finally, in Section IV, this Comment will apply those laws to the proposed 
cyber defense spectrum and distinguish between lawful defenses and unlawful 
cybercrimes. This application suggests that cybersecurity professionals are almost 
always justified in employing passive defense measures. Indeed, these are rarely 
even implicated by the Convention, as they operate entirely internally to an entity’s 
network. As for active-passive measures, their permissibility depends upon 
whether they qualify as one of three potential defenses suggested as justified by 
the Convention. Finally, purely active defense measures are almost never 
permissible under the Convention, and therefore are generally unlawful under 
international law. 
Categorizing measures in this way should help to clarify the boundaries 
within which cyber defenders must work when it comes to innovating and 
advancing cyber defense. 
II. THE BUDAPEST CONVENTION 
The Budapest Convention,14 which entered into force in 2004, is the only 
binding international instrument related to cybercrime.15 It was created to 
articulate a “common criminal policy aimed at the protection of society against 
cybercrime,” and specifically intends “to deter action directed against the 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of computer systems, networks and 
computer data as well as the misuse of such systems, networks, and data by 
providing for the criminalization of such conduct.”16 The Convention sets forth 
the powers and procedures that states have in investigating, prosecuting, and 
punishing these crimes.17 Sixty-one states have ratified it, including Australia, 
Canada, Israel, Japan, the U.S., and most countries in the European Union.18  
The Convention approaches these goals from three different angles. First, it 
standardizes the domestic criminal law related to cybercrime in states that are party 
to (and therefore bound by) the Budapest Convention (hereinafter “States Party”). 
Second, it motivates the creation of the necessary criminal procedural laws to 
investigate and prosecute cybercrime within States Party. Finally, it establishes an 
agile international cooperation regime.19 It defines nine discrete offenses: illegal 
access, illegal interception, data interference, system interference, misuse of 
                                                 
14   Convention on Cybercrime, Nov. 23, 2001, T.I.A.S. 13174, E.T.S. No. 185, 
http://perma.cc/4KKP-2YM7 [hereinafter Budapest Convention].  
15  Budapest Convention and Related Standards, COUNCIL OF EUR., http://perma.cc/C34X-EUJF. 
16  Budapest Convention, supra note 14, at 2.  
17  See id. 
18  Chart of Signatures and Ratifications of Treaty 185, COUNCIL OF EUR.,  http://perma.cc/57D7-XPBF. 
19  See generally, Budapest Convention, supra note 14. 
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devices, computer-related forgery, computer-related fraud, child pornography-
related offenses, and offenses related to copyright.20 
The Convention further delineates several procedural law issues, including 
expedited preservation of stored data, expedited preservation and partial 
disclosure of traffic data, production order, search and seizure of computer data, 
real-time collection of traffic data, and interception of content data.21 It also calls 
for constructing a network that operates twenty-four hours a day, seven days a 
week to facilitate rapid assistance among signatories “for the purpose of 
investigations  or proceedings concerning criminal offences related to computer 
systems and  data,  or  for  the  collection  of  evidence  in  electronic  form  of  a  
criminal  offence.”22 
Additionally, the Council of Europe published several guidance documents 
to aid in the interpretation of the Convention. Although these documents “[do] 
not constitute [instruments] providing an authoritative interpretation of the 
Convention,” they “might be of such a nature as to facilitate the application of the 
provisions contained therein.”23 The Council also explains that “Guidance Notes 
represent the common understanding of the parties to this treaty regarding the 
use of the Convention.”24 Accordingly, they are relevant to the present analysis, 
and even set forth several key definitions.25 
                                                 
20  COUNCIL OF EUR., Explanatory Report to the Convention on Cybercrime (Nov. 23, 2001), ¶ 18, 
http://perma.cc/A6XF-647V [hereinafter Explanatory Report]. 
21  Id. at ¶ 19. 
22  Budapest Convention, supra note 14, at art. 35. 
23  Explanatory Report, supra note 20, at 1.  
24  Cybercrime Convention Committee, T-CY Guidance Note #3: Transborder Access to Data (Article 32), at 3 
(Dec. 2–3, 2014), http://perma.cc/494T-7EHG.  
25  The Explanatory Report, for example, defines “computer system” as  
a device consisting of hardware and software developed for automatic 
processing of digital data. It may include input, output, and storage facilities. It 
may stand alone or be connected in a network with other similar devices [sic] 
“Automatic” means without direct human intervention, “processing of data” 
means that data in the computer system is operated by executing a computer 
program . . . A computer system usually consists of different devices, to be 
distinguished as the processor or central processing unit, and peripherals. A 
“peripheral” is a device that performs certain specific functions in interaction 
with the processing unit, such as a printer, video screen, CD reader/writer or 
other storage device. 
Explanatory Report, supra note 20, at ¶ 23.  
 
“[C]omputer program” is defined as “a set of instructions that can be executed by the computer to 
achieve the intended result.” Id.  
 
“[N]etwork” is defined as  
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All of the procedures established by the Convention are limited by a concern 
for preserving human rights, including those enshrined in the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the 
U.N. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and other similar 
instruments.26 All measures taken pursuant to the Convention must adhere to the 
international legal principle of proportionality.27 
Notably, however, countries such as Russia, China, and India, among others, 
have not ratified the Convention.28 These countries are large, geopolitically 
powerful, and active in cyberspace, so their unwillingness to ratify the Convention 
might be perceived as weakening the Convention’s impact. Their rationales for 
refusing to ratify tend to fall into one of two categories. First, they object to 
ratifying something when they have not participated in its drafting process.29 
Second, they consider the treaty to be an infringement on sovereignty.30 In the 
specific cases of Russia and China, in addition to objecting on both of these bases, 
these states have long been reticent to participate in cooperation or other 
information or intelligence sharing when it comes to cyberspace.31 
A. Overview of Offenses and Remedies under the 
Budapest Convention 
The Budapest Convention requires States Party to adopt legislation or other 
measures that criminalize intentional commission of certain offenses. These 
include, as relevant to the topic of active cyber defense: illegal access to computer 
systems, illegal interception of data, data interference, system interference, misuse 
of devices, computer-related forgery, and computer-related fraud. This Comment 
                                                 
an interconnection between two or more computer systems. The connections 
may be earthbound (e.g., wire or cable), wireless (e.g., radio, infrared, or 
satellite), or both. A network may be geographically limited to a small area (local 
area networks) or may span a large area (wide area networks), and such networks 
may themselves be interconnected . . . What is essential is that data is exchanged 
over the network. 
Id. at ¶ 24. 
26  See Budapest Convention, supra note 14, at art. 15. 
27  Id. Proportionality encompasses the idea “that a State’s acts must be a rational and reasonable exercise 
of means towards achieving a permissible goal, without unduly encroaching on protected rights of either 
the individual or another State.” Emily Crawford, Proportionality, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW ¶ 1 (2011), http://perma.cc/YJ8E-VB5C.  
28  Joyce Hakmeh, Building a Stronger International Legal Framework on Cybercrime, CHATHAM HOUSE (June 
6, 2017), http://perma.cc/TJT5-MMQB. 
29  Id. 
30  Id. 
31  Id. 
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only discusses these offenses as they are most relevant to the types of actions 
undertaken as part of mounting an active cyber defense. 
These offenses are further punished in their inchoate form via Article 11, 
which requires States Party to criminalize both “aiding and abetting” and 
“attempting” the delineated offenses.32 Article 12 provides for corporate liability 
for these crimes.33 Although individuals who commit these crimes may be subject 
to deprivation of liberty, that punitive option seems unavailable under the 
Convention for pursuing corporate liability.34 
The Convention also provides guidance on jurisdiction, noting that States 
Party have jurisdiction over offenses committed within their respective territories, 
on a ship flying the state’s flag, on an aircraft registered under the laws of the State 
Party, or by a national of the State Party if the offense is criminalized in the State 
where the crime is committed or if it “is committed outside the territorial 
jurisdiction of any State.”35 States Party may exercise jurisdiction in accordance 
with their own domestic law, and the Convention provides a procedure by which 
jurisdictional conflicts might be resolved.36 
In exchange for the promise to criminalize these offenses, the Convention 
provides extensive processes and procedures for mutual assistance and 
information sharing.37 Not only must States Party implement domestic legislation 
criminalizing the enumerated offenses, they must do the same with regard to 
ensuring the ability to meet mutual assistance obligations under the Convention.38 
Moreover, States Party may forward information obtained in the course of their 
investigations to other states in order to assist them in carrying out the 
Convention.39 However, States Party may insert provisions into their 
implementing legislation delineating when they will refuse cooperation, along with 
other conditions. 40 
States Party may only undertake two specific actions without authorization 
from another Party. First, States Party may “access publicly available (open source) 
stored computer data, regardless of where the data is located geographically.”41 
                                                 
32  Budapest Convention, supra note 14, at art. 11.  
33  Id. at art. 12. 
34  Id. at art. 13. 
35  Id. at art. 22. 
36  Budapest Convention, supra note 14, at art. 22. 
37  See id. at arts. 25–26.  
38  Id. at art. 25. 
39  Id. at art. 26. 
40  Budapest Convention, supra note 14, at art. 25.  
41  Id. at art. 32. 
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Second, States Party may “access or receive, through a computer system in [their 
territories], stored computer data located in another Party” as long as the Party 
obtains the consent of the person with the lawful authority to disclose that 
information.42 
In summary, the Convention requires States Party to criminalize certain 
delineated offenses in exchange for assurances of help in bringing those who 
commit those offenses to justice. It attempts to construct an investigatory 
framework that respects national sovereignty while still incentivizing cooperation 
over self-help. 
B. Offenses 
Depending on how they are developed and executed, many potential 
components of an active cyber defense strategy could rise to the level of offenses 
prohibited by the Budapest Convention. In order to understand where the 
Convention draws this line, this Section further details the relevant offenses and 
the behavior they target. Specifically, those offenses are illegal access to computer 
systems, illegal interception of data, data interference, system interference, misuses 
of devices, computer-related forgery, and computer-related fraud. This Section 
will also discuss the inchoate form of these offenses, as well as potential corporate 
liability. 
1. Illegal Access to Computer Systems 
The Budapest Convention criminalizes illegal access to computer systems,43 
including “mobile phones or ‘smart’ phones, PDAs, tablets, and other [systems] 
that produce, process, or transmit data.”44 A computer system is defined in the 
Convention as “any device or group of interconnected or related devices, one or 
more of which, pursuant to a program, performs automatic processing of data.”45 
According to the Explanatory Report, “illegal access” encapsulates 
“dangerous threats to and attacks against the security … of computer systems and 
data.”46 It further explains that “security” encompasses the systems’ and data’s 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability47 and clarifies that “mere unauthorized 
intrusion[s]” like hacking should be illegal as well, as those intrusions can 
                                                 
42  Id. 
43  Budapest Convention, supra note 14, at art. 2.  
44  Cybercrime Convention Committee, T-CY Guidance Note #1: On the Notion of “Computer System” at 3 
(Dec. 2012), http://perma.cc/S78P-VYHC. 
45  Budapest Convention, supra note 14, at art. 1.  
46  Explanatory Report, supra note 20, at ¶ 44; see Budapest Convention, supra note 14, at art. 2. 
47  Explanatory Report, supra note 20, at ¶ 44.   
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compromise data confidentiality or even embolden hackers to commit more 
serious offenses in the future.48 The Report further defines “access” as “the 
entering of the whole or any part of a computer system” and clarifies that “it does 
not include the mere sending of an e-mail message or file to that system.”49 
According to the Report, the method of entry is irrelevant, as long as the system 
is entered via some connection point.50 
When it comes to actually criminalizing conduct, the Explanatory Report 
provides that States Party are welcome to take a broad approach and criminalize 
hacking in general.51 Alternatively, they may narrow the definition of criminal 
behavior using the qualifications noted in the second sentence of Article 252—
namely, “infringing security measures, [with] the intent of obtaining computer data 
or other dishonest intent, or in relation to a computer system that is connected to 
another computer system.”53 
2. Illegal Interception of Data 
The illegal interception of non-public transmissions of computer data to, 
from, or within a computer system using technical means is treated as a crime 
under the Budapest Convention.54 This “[i]llegal interception” provision aims to 
protect data privacy and is intended to mimic the violation of privacy that occurs 
via wiretaps and recordings of telephone conversations in the physical world.55 
The Explanatory Report clarifies that all forms of electronic transfer can give 
rise to an Article 3 offense. According to the Report, interception by “technical 
means” involves “listening to, monitoring or surveillance of the content of 
communications, [] the procuring of the content of data either directly, through 
access and use of the computer system, or indirectly, through the use of electronic 
eavesdropping or tapping devices.”56 Interception can also involve recording.57 
“Technical means,” according to the Report, include “technical devices fixed 
to transmission lines as well as devices to collect and record wireless 
communications” and “may include the use of software, passwords, and codes.”58 
                                                 
48  Id. 
49  Id. at ¶ 46.  
50  Id. 
51  Explanatory Report, supra note 20, at ¶ 50. 
52  Id. 
53  Budapest Convention, supra note 14, at art. 2 (emphasis added). 
54  Id. at art. 3. 
55  Explanatory Report, supra note 20, at ¶ 51. 
56  Id. at ¶ 53. 
57  Id. 
58  Id. 
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Apparently, the “technical means” qualification was intended to avoid over-
criminalization.59 
Article 3 offenses apply to “non-public” transmissions of computer data—that 
is, the transmission, and not the data, is what is non-public. Indeed, the data may 
well be public information that parties wish to communicate confidentially, or 
even data “kept secret for commercial purposes.”60 Employee communications 
also fall under an umbrella of “non-public” transmissions,61 but domestic law can 
provide some legitimate cover for intercepting these communications.62 In such a 
case, interception would take place “with right.”63 As to the transmission itself, 
States Party have the option of requiring that the communication take place 
between remote computer systems (as opposed to within a single computer 
system or between two systems belonging to the same person).64 
Finally, the Convention requires that an interception be committed 
“intentionally” and “without right” for criminal liability to attach.65 The 
intercepting person is justified in his or her action, for example, if acting with the 
authorization of the transmission’s participants or if “surveillance is lawfully 
authorized in the interests of national security or the detection of offences by 
investigating authorities.”66 Furthermore, common commercial practices like 
using “cookies” are not intended to be criminalized, as these interceptions do not 
occur “without right.”67 
3. Data Interference 
“The damaging, deletion, deterioration, alteration, or suppression of 
computer data” is considered a criminal offense under the Budapest Convention.68 
Data interference as an offense is meant to protect computer data and programs 
from intentional infliction of damage in a way similar to the protections enjoyed 
by physical objects.69 The legal interest at stake “is the integrity and the proper 
functioning or use of stored computer data or computer programs.”70 The Report 
                                                 
59  Explanatory Report, supra note 20, at ¶ 53. 
60  Id. at ¶ 54. 
61  Id. 
62  Id. at ¶ 58.  
63  Explanatory Report, supra note 20, at ¶ 58.  
64  Id. at ¶ 55. 
65  Id. at ¶ 58. 
66  Id. 
67  Explanatory Report, supra note 20, at ¶ 58. 
68  Budapest Convention, supra note 14, at art. 4. 
69  Explanatory Report, supra note 20, at ¶ 60. 
70  Id.   
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clarifies that “damaging” and “deteriorating” as used in Article 4 specifically refer 
“to a negative alteration of the integrity or of information content of data and 
programmes.”71 According to the Report, “deletion” of data is meant to have an 
equivalent meaning to the destruction of a physical object.72 “Suppress[ion]” 
means “any action that prevents or terminates the availability of the data to the 
person who has access to the computer or the data carrier on which it was stored,” 
and “alteration” involves “the modification of existing data.”73 
The Report clarifies that this offense covers “[t]he input of malicious codes, 
such as viruses and Trojan horses,” 74 as well as any resulting changes in data;75 
however, activities considered common or inherent in network design or 
commercial operating practices are not criminalized, as such acts are done “with 
right.”76 These activities could include “the testing or protection of the security of 
a computer system authorised by the owner or operator, or the reconfiguration of 
a computer’s operating system that takes place when the operator of a system 
acquires new software.”77 Moreover, modifying traffic data in order to facilitate 
anonymous communications or to ensure secure communications (as with 
encryption) is considered “a legitimate protection of privacy” and is therefore 
undertaken “with right.”78 Parties are permitted, however, to “criminalise certain 
abuses related to anonymous communications,” for example, when they are used 
to facilitate the commission of crimes.79 
4. System Interference 
The Budapest Convention criminalizes “the serious hindering . . . of the 
functioning of a computer system by inputting, transmitting, damaging, deleting, 
deteriorating, altering, or suppressing computer data.”80 According to the 
Explanatory Report, the legal interest at stake is ensuring the proper functioning 
of computer and telecommunication systems.81 The Report defines “hindering” 
as “actions that interfere with the proper functioning of the computer system,” 
                                                 
71  Explanatory Report, supra note 20, at ¶ 61. 
72  Id. 
73  Id. 
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75  Explanatory Report, supra note 20, at ¶ 61. 
76  Explanatory Report, supra note 20, at ¶ 62. 
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80  Budapest Convention, supra note 14, at art. 5. 
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and clarifies that such hindrance must be sufficiently serious “to give rise to 
criminal sanction.”82 
States Party are permitted to “require a minimum amount of damage to be 
caused in order for the hindering to be considered serious.”83 The drafters 
themselves considered it “serious” when sending data to a system in a way that  
had “a significant detrimental effect on the ability of the owner or operator to use 
the system, or to communicate with other systems.”84 They further noted that 
“spamming,” or sending messages “in large quantities or with a high frequency” 
should only rise to a level meriting criminal sanction when sent intentionally and 
in a way that seriously hinders communication.85 Parties are left to determine on 
their own how seriously a system must be hindered for the act to be punishable 
by criminal law.86 
5. Misuse of Devices 
Under the Budapest Convention, “the production, sale, procurement for 
use, import, distribution or otherwise making available of” devices and computer 
programs “designed or adapted primarily for the purpose of committing” illegal 
access, illegal interception, data interference, or system interference is a crime.87 
These are devices and computer programs that include computer passwords or 
access codes by which any part of a computer system could be accessed.88 Article 
6 further calls for the criminalization of possessing such items with the intent to 
commit the delineated offenses.89 Further, Article 6 clarifies that its text “shall not 
be interpreted as imposing criminal liability where [there is no] purpose of 
committing” the delineated offenses.90 The Convention lists “authorized testing 
or protection of a computer system” as an example of when this might be the 
case.91 
Article 6 targets the black market for the various tools required to perpetrate 
cyberattacks and intrusions.92 By criminalizing the acquisition of such tools, the 
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83  Id. at ¶ 67. 
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85  Explanatory Report, supra note 20, at ¶ 69. 
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87  Budapest Convention, supra note 14, at art. 6. 
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91  Id.  
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Convention’s drafters aimed to cut off the problem at the source.93 The Report 
defines “distribution” as “the active act of forwarding data to others,” and defines 
“making available” as “the placing online devices for the use of others.”94 The 
drafters also intended “making available” to encompass “the creation or 
compilation of hyperlinks in order to facilitate access to such devices.”95 
“Computer program,” as used in Article 6, “refers to programs that are for 
example designed to alter or even destroy data or interfere with the operation of 
systems, such as virus programs, or programs designed or adapted to gain access 
to computer systems.”96 
After extensive debate, the drafters elected not to restrict the category of 
devices to “those which are designed exclusively or specifically for committing 
offenses.”97 In their view, this would be too narrow a category and, as a result, 
would make it more difficult to meet prosecutorial burdens of proof. This would 
effectively nullify the offense’s criminalization.98 Moreover, dual-use devices 
would have been excluded, despite presenting a similar threat. On the other hand, 
the drafters also rejected the idea of including all devices, including those both 
illegally and legally produced.99 They settled on making the “intent” prong of the 
offense dispositive for imposing punishment and permitting States Party to decide 
how many devices are necessary to establish criminal liability.100 
The drafters did not intend to criminalize possession of devices that are 
“produced and put on the market for legitimate purposes.”101 As an example, they 
suggested that those products made “to counter-attacks against computer 
systems” would fall into this category.102 They manifested this intent by further 
requiring that there be evidence of specific intent to use the device to commit an 
offense described earlier in the Convention.103 
6. Computer-Related Forgery 
“[T]he input, alteration, deletion, or suppression of computer data, resulting 
in inauthentic data with the intent that it be considered or acted upon for legal 
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purposes as if it were authentic” is treated as a crime under the Budapest 
Convention.104 
This offense was intended to “parallel” the offense of forging documents in 
the physical world.105 The thinking behind this provision was that “[m]anipulations 
of [ ] data with evidentiary value may have the same serious consequences as 
traditional acts of forgery if a third party is thereby misled.”106 Article 7 further 
defines “computer-related forgery” as involving the unauthorized creation or 
alteration of stored data “so that they acquire a different evidentiary value in the 
course of legal transactions,” citing the fact that such transactions rely on the 
“security and reliability of electronic data.”107 Because “national concepts of 
forgery vary greatly,” the drafters “agreed that the deception as to authenticity 
refers at minimum to the issuer of the data, regardless of the correctness or 
veracity of the contents of the data.”108 That being said, States Party are permitted 
to apply the term “authentic” not only to the data’s issuer, but to the data’s 
genuineness as well.109 
Because the data referred to in this provision is equivalent to a document 
with legal effects, “[t]he unauthorized ‘input’ of correct or incorrect data brings 
about a situation that corresponds to the making of a false document.”110 
Accordingly, further alterations, deletions, or suppression would roughly equate 
to falsifying a real document.111 The Explanatory Report defines “alterations” as 
“modifications, variations, [and] partial changes;” “deletions” as “removal of data 
from a data medium;” and “suppression” as “holding back [or] conceal[ing] [ ] 
data.”112 “For legal purposes” refers “to legal transactions and documents which 
are legally relevant.”113 Under Article 7, States Party are also permitted to require 
some kind of dishonest intent in order for criminal liability to attach.114 
7. Computer-Related Fraud 
The Budapest Convention criminalizes “the causing of a loss of property to 
another person by: (a) any input, alteration, deletion or suppression of computer 
                                                 
104  Budapest Convention, supra note 14, at art. 7. 
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data; (b) any interference with the functioning of a computer system, with 
fraudulent or dishonest intent of procuring, without right, an economic benefit 
for oneself or for another person.”115 
The purpose of Article 8 is to “criminalize any undue manipulation in the 
course of data processing with the intention to effect an illegal transfer of 
property.”116 Article 8(b) specifically addresses actions like “hardware 
manipulations, acts suppressing printouts and acts affecting recording or flow of 
data, or the sequence in which programs are run.”117 
Manipulations—whether of data, systems, hardware, or otherwise—under 
this section “are criminalized if they produce a direct economic or possessory loss 
of another person’s property and the perpetrator acted with the intent of 
procuring an unlawful economic gain for himself or for another person.”118 The 
Report defines “loss of property” as “includ[ing] loss of money, tangibles, and 
intangibles with an economic value.”119 The intent required under the Article 
“refers to the computer manipulation or interference causing loss of property to 
another,” and the offense further requires some “fraudulent or other dishonest 
intent to gain an economic or other benefit for oneself or another.”120 This 
limitation ensures that general, non-fraudulent commercial practices that simply 
happen to be economically detrimental to one party and beneficial to another are 
not included in this offense.121 
8. Inchoate Offenses and Corporate Liability 
Article 11 of the Budapest Convention requires States Party to criminalize 
both “aiding and abetting” and “attempt[ing]” the delineated offenses.122 
Separately, Article 12 provides for corporate liability for these crimes.123 Although 
individuals who commit these crimes may be subject to deprivation of liberty, that 
punitive option appears inapplicable in cases of corporate liability under Article 
13 of the Convention.124 
The Explanatory Report provides helpful guidance on these provisions. The 
Convention requires States Party to criminalize aiding and abetting the 
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commission of any offense listed in Articles 2–10, but does not require the same 
for attempts.125 This is because not all of those offenses lend themselves to an 
“attempt” framework, and the legal systems within some States Party limit the 
situations in which attempt can be punished.126 As a result, attempt is only 
criminalized for those offenses under Articles 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9(1)(a), and 9(1)(c).127 
However, States Party have the option to make a reservation refusing to 
criminalize attempt at all, or to only criminalize it in some cases.128 The 
Explanatory Report notes that this provision aims to maximize ratification of the 
Convention while respecting legal traditions inherent in the States Party.129 
As to aiding and abetting, liability attaches “where the person who commits 
a crime established in the Convention is aided by another person who also intends 
that the crime be committed.”130 For example, a service provider without any 
criminal intent to assist in the transmission of harmful code would not be 
considered to be aiding and abetting a cyberattack.131 
Regarding corporate liability, the Explanatory Report explains that Article 
12 is “intended to impose liability on corporations, associations and similar legal 
persons for the criminal actions undertaken by a person in a leading position 
within such legal person, where undertaken for the benefit of that legal person.”132 
The Article also suggests that such an entity would be liable where “a leading 
person fails to supervise or control an employee or an agent of the legal person, 
where such failure facilitates the commission by that employee or agent of one of 
the offenses established in the Convention.”133 
Paragraph 1 of Article 12 sets forth four conditions that must be met in 
order to establish corporate liability. An offense described in the Convention must 
be committed first, by a person, second, with a leading position, third, who is 
acting within the scope of his or her authority, and fourth, for the benefit of the 
legal person.134 The Report defines a “person who has a leading position” as “a 
natural person who has a high position in the organization, such as a director.”135 
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Such persons generally have “a power of representation or an authority to take 
decisions or to exercise control.”136 
The Article also provides for the imposition of liability when the crime is 
committed by a person “acting under the legal person’s authority”—that is, “one 
of its employees or agents acting within the scope of their authority.”137 In order 
to attach liability in those circumstances, three conditions must be fulfilled. First, 
an offense must have been committed by an employee or agent of the legal person. 
Second, the offense must have been committed for the legal person’s benefit. 
Third, the failure of the “person with a leading position” to supervise the 
employee or agent must have made the offense possible.138 
The Explanatory Report notes that “failure to supervise should be 
interpreted to include failure to take appropriate and reasonable measures to 
prevent employees or agents from committing criminal activities on behalf of the 
legal person,” and it sets out a few factors that can be used to evaluate what 
constitutes an “appropriate and reasonable” measure.139 Those factors include 
“the type of the business, its size, the standards or the established business best 
practices.”140 The Report is careful to note that “[t]his should not be interpreted 
as requiring a general surveillance regime over employee communications.”141 
9. Sanctions 
As to the sanctions put in place to penalize the criminalized offenses, the 
Convention requires States Party to implement punishments that are “effective, 
proportionate and dissuasive” and include the possibility of a term of 
imprisonment for natural persons.142 Sanctions available for legal persons should 
be similarly “effective, proportionate, and dissuasive,” and may be “criminal, 
administrative, or civil” in nature.143 States Party must “provide for the possibility 
of imposing monetary sanctions on legal persons.”144 Generally, States Party have 
discretion “to create a system of criminal offenses and sanctions that is compatible 
with their existing national legal systems.”145 
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C. Additional Relevant Concepts in the Budapest Convention 
The Convention repeatedly states that the conduct it prohibits is conduct 
done “without right.”146 The Explanatory Report notes that this phrase “reflects 
the insight that the conduct described is not always punishable per se, but may be 
legal or justified not only in cases where classical legal defenses are applicable, like consent, 
self-defense, or necessity, but where other principles or interests lead to the exclusion 
of criminal liability.”147 Therefore, when it comes to implementing these principles 
in domestic law, the Report suggests that actions taken “without right” might refer 
to those taken “without authority” or those taken outside the scope of existing 
legal defenses.148 The “authority” referred to in the Report can be conferred by 
any number of entities—the legislature, for example, or the executive, among 
others.149 This suggests that States Party are able to permit certain cyber activity if 
it occurs in the context of an established legal defense, excuse, or justification.150 
The Report further clarifies that accessing a computer system intended to be freely 
and openly available to the public is always done “with right.”151 
Furthermore, the Explanatory Report clarifies that the Convention’s framers 
did not intend to criminalize “legitimate and common activities inherent in the 
design of networks or legitimate and common operating or commercial 
practices.”152 How such exceptions would work within various domestic legal 
systems is, per the Report, a decision left to each individual State Party.153 
The Explanatory Report also takes up the issue of Article 32, which permits 
States Party to access certain types of data without authorization.154 According to 
the Report, the issue of unilateral access was discussed at length by the 
Convention’s drafters, who considered in detail the instances in which such 
unilateral action would be permissible.155 Ultimately, they concluded that 
preparing a comprehensive legal regime in this area was not possible at the time 
of the Convention’s writing.156 As a result, the two situations in Article 32 where 
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permission for unilateral access is granted are the two situations in which all 
drafters agreed that it would be permissible.157 
The Report outlines these two situations: 1) when the data is publicly 
available anyway, and 2) when “the Party has accessed or received data located 
outside of its territory through a computer system in its territory, and it has 
obtained the lawful and voluntary consent of the person who has lawful authority 
to disclose the data to the Party through that system.”158 The person with lawful 
authority varies based upon the circumstances. According to the Report, one 
example would be a service provider who has the authority to retrieve data from 
a person’s email and voluntarily disclose it to law enforcement officials.159 
The Council further published a Guidance Note specifically related to Article 
32.160 The Note characterized Article 32(b) as “an exception to the principle of 
territoriality” and explained that it “permits unilateral transborder access without 
the need for mutual assistance under limited circumstances.”161 It clarifies that 
“transborder access” means “to unilaterally access computer data stored in 
another Party without seeking mutual assistance.”162 Article 32(b) may only be 
used if it is “known where the data are located,” as it references “stored computer 
data located in another Party.”163 Therefore, to invoke the Article in the first place, 
one must know: 1) where the data is located, and 2) that it is located in the 
jurisdiction of another Party to the Convention.164 The Note is explicit that if the 
data’s location is unknown, or if the data is stored domestically or within a non-
Party, then Article 32(b) does not apply.165 Regarding the section’s required 
“consent” element, the Note clarifies that the term means that the person being 
asked to disclose data cannot be forced to do so, nor deceived in order to induce 
consent.166 
However, the Note also specifies that Article 32(b) is only to be applied 
within the context of criminal investigations conducted pursuant to Article 14.167 
Article 14 imposes the obligation upon States Party to implement legislation or 
other measures to ensure that criminal investigations can take place for the 
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offenses specifically criminalized in the Convention.168 Authorities are to apply the 
same standards under Article 32(b) that they would domestically. Therefore, if a 
disclosure would not be permitted domestically, it would not be permitted under 
Article 32(b).169 
III. DEFINING ACTIVE CYBER DEFENSE 
This Section constructs a working definition of active cyber defense. To do 
so, this Section reviews the general status of cybersecurity, discusses the various 
definitions, merits, and drawbacks of active cyber defense as put forth in existing 
literature, and defines a spectrum of cyber defensive measures. The legality of 
conduct on this spectrum will be analyzed in greater detail in Section IV. 
A. The Cybersecurity Landscape 
Nearly every internet-connected global citizen—from multinational 
corporations, to governments, to individuals—is vulnerable to malicious cyber 
activities. Cybersecurity measures aim to keep hackers from accessing “assets 
belonging to or connecting to an organization’s network.”170 Intuitively, this 
means that cyber defenders work to deny network access to would-be intruders 
in order to protect the data contained therein.171 
These types of attacks are perpetrated using malware. “Malware,” an 
abbreviated form of “malicious software,” is designed and used to access and, in 
many cases, harm a computer.172 It can be deployed in a variety of ways—
sometimes through direct attacks, but other times using stealthier means.173 These 
stealthier means can include “phishing” or “spearphishing,”174 which involve 
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sending fake e-mails to employees to get malware onto an otherwise protected 
system, “watering holes,”175 or any number of other methods. Part of the challenge 
cyber defenders face is the ever-evolving nature of these malware deployment 
methods. 
Hackers176 seek access to networks and systems almost constantly. In 2017 
alone, 159,700 cyber incidents impacted businesses around the world, making it 
the “worst year ever” in terms of data breaches and cyberattacks.177 These 
intrusions have a variety of purposes, ranging from activism to criminal activity to 
espionage, and even to acts of war. The largest-scale cyberattacks in recent years 
have tended to focus on the theft of personal data or intellectual property.178 
Ransomware, or malware that locks one’s computer and prevents access to data 
until a ransom is paid, has also come into vogue.179 The WannaCry virus that 
paralyzed hospitals in the U.K. demonstrates the dangers of ransomware 
attacks.180 In that attack, hackers denied doctors, nurses, and hospital staff access 
to their computer systems, which contained patient medical records, until a 
ransom was paid.181 
The number of successful cyberattacks alone indicates that the cyber defense 
status quo is not working. The current approach to cybersecurity tends to 
overwhelmingly rely on static measures—that is, passive security measures 
intended to deny attackers access to systems without daily human involvement.182 
Examples of these measures include firewalls, antivirus software, and intrusion 
detection systems.183 This inadequacy has moved both scholars and security 
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professionals to begin considering the utility of more active defense measures in 
order to change the dynamic between attackers and defenders.184 Indeed, some 
have referred to the “scan, firewall, and patch” tradition of passive defense as the 
“duck and cover”185 of modern cybersecurity.186 
B. Constructing a Definition of Active Cyber Defense 
This Comment defines “active defense” as “[t]he synchronized, real-time 
capability to discover, detect, analyze, and mitigate threats.”187 This definition was 
initially constructed by Paul Rosenzweig, a professorial lecturer in law at the 
George Washington University School of Law. Under this definition, defenses 
“operat[e] at network speed using sensors, software and intelligence to detect and 
stop malicious activity ideally before it can affect networks and systems.”188 As 
will be discussed later, this definition captures a broad variety of measures. Such 
breadth is particularly important because this Comment seeks to draw lines and 
set boundaries for what active cyber defense measures are permissible under the 
Budapest Convention. 
That being said, a multitude of definitions of “active cyber defense” have 
been proposed in various spheres—from government, to the technology sector, 
to the military, to the legal community. These definitions include: 
 “[E]lectronic countermeasures designed to strike attacking computer 
systems and shut down cyber attacks midstream;”189 
 “[A]n approach to achieving cyber security predicated upon the 
deployment of measures to detect, analyse, identify and mitigate threats to 
and from communications systems and networks in real-time, combined 
with the capability and resources to take proactive or offensive action 
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against threats and threat entities including action in those entities’ home 
networks;”190 
 “[A] collection of synchronized, real-time capabilities to discover, define, 
analyze and mitigate cyber threats and vulnerabilities . . . [which] would 
enable cyber defenders to more readily disrupt and neutralize cyberattacks 
as they happen . . . [and which are] solely defensive in nature;”191 and 
 “[A] . . . category of response to cyberattacks [that] enable[s] attacked 
parties to detect, trace, and then actively respond to a threat by, for 
example, interrupting an attack in progress to mitigate damage to the 
system.”192 
This list is non-exhaustive. The lack of agreement on the precise contours of what 
qualifies as an active cyber defense measure has created extensive difficulties in 
categorizing and characterizing different options as lawful or unlawful under 
international law. 
This Comment purposefully uses a broad definition of active defense in 
order to more specifically define what conduct is and is not permissible under 
international law. Accordingly, it will utilize the definition from Paul Rosenzweig 
as set forth above: 
[T]he synchronized, real-time capability to discover, detect, analyze, 
and mitigate threats. It operates at network speed using sensors, 
software and intelligence to detect and stop malicious activity ideally 
before it can affect networks and systems. While intrusions may not 
always be stopped at network boundary, an entity may operate and 
improve upon its advanced sensors to detect, discover, map, and 
mitigate malicious activity on an entity’s network.193 
This comprehensive definition of the term permits a thorough examination of all 
measures that could conceivably be considered “active defense,” even those that 
seem facially “passive.” 
Understanding this definition requires fleshing out a few finer distinctions. 
First, the process of pursuing an “active defense” can be broken down into three 
steps: 1) detecting an intrusion, 2) identifying its origin, and 3) responding in some 
form.194 Second, active defense tactics can be divided into “internal” and 
“external” measures.195 Internal measures are those taken on one’s own network. 
Examples include monitoring network traffic for irregularities, blocking incoming 
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traffic selectively based on its source, and constructing traps for would-be 
hackers.196 External measures are those undertaken outside of one’s network—
whether they be on an adversary’s network or one belonging to a neutral third 
party. 197 These tactics could include identifying the sites or servers from which 
suspicious network activity originated, modifying that originating server in some 
way to halt its activities in relation to one’s network, accessing data from an 
adversary on his or her home turf, or even outright attacking the adversary’s 
servers to cause damage. 
In order to separate legal conduct from illegal conduct, these activities must 
be categorized along some sort of spectrum. Some authors have undertaken this 
task in the past.198 This Comment will focus less on the legality of individual, 
discrete measures and more on crafting a set of categories for evaluating the 
legality of active cyber defense measures. 
C. Defining a Spectrum of Active Cyber Defense 
To assist in understanding the point at which legal conduct becomes illegal 
conduct, this Comment outlines a spectrum of cyber defense activities divided 
into three categories: passive, active-passive, and active. Section IV of this 
Comment analyzes each category’s permissibility under international law. 
Passive defenses are used entirely within the boundaries of one’s own 
network and never involve reaching beyond it. Such defenses include installing 
and upgrading antivirus software, constructing firewalls, segmenting certain 
critical servers in a way that prevents connection to the internet, and engaging in 
basic “cyber hygiene” practices.199 This category also encompasses blocking 
incoming traffic to one’s network, whether selectively or universally, and 
employing notification beacons that alert system administrators to attempts to 
remove files or otherwise tamper with the network.200 
Active defenses mark the opposite end of the spectrum. Carol Hayes, a 
research fellow at the University of Illinois College of Law, and Jay Kesan, the H. 
Ross and Helen Workman Research Scholar at the University of Illinois College 
of Law, offer an apt characterization for tactics in this category. These types of 
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defenses tend to be “offensive actions undertaken with the goal of neutralizing an 
immediate threat rather than retaliating.”201 These measures are used outside of 
the network and impact external systems, whether belonging to an attacker or to 
a neutral third party. Examples of active tactics include hacking an adversary in 
order to retrieve stolen information,202 disrupt its network, or damage its 
network.203 
Active-passive defenses lie somewhere between these endpoints. These 
measures encompass those like digital “dye-packs” or other devices that enable 
defenders to track data taken from their networks,204 hunt and expel intruders on 
the network, funnel potential adversaries to decoy networks, and other actions 
taken to investigate and attribute intrusions.205 This category will require the most 
intensive, case-by-case analysis in order to establish permissibility under 
international law. That analysis must be guided by the principles set forth in the 
Budapest Convention, as it is the only legally binding international instrument 
addressing the question of when an act in cyberspace becomes criminal.206 
It is entirely possible that the same tactic could appear in all three categories 
depending on how a given tactic is built and operated. Take, for example, the 
honeypot from the opening scenario. If that honeypot functioned solely to permit 
defenders to observe network traffic and has zero effect on any other system, it is 
likely considered passive. If that honeypot infected intruders with a tracking 
beacon that allows cyber defenders to determine where a particular intruder is 
based, it would be characterized as active-passive. Finally, if that honeypot 
attached a virus that would delete all data on the intruder’s home system, it would 
qualify as an active defense. 
Clearly, the term “active cyber defense” is very broad and cannot be 
characterized as “legal” or “illegal” on its face. Rather, these finer distinctions 
permit a more nuanced understanding of when and why a particular tactic might 
rise to the level of an international crime. 
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IV. IDENTIFYING ACTIVE DEFENSE STRATEGIES PERMISSIBLE 
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Section II undertook a comprehensive interpretation of the Budapest 
Convention and relevant explanatory documents. That interpretation highlighted 
several offenses related to computer data, forbidding any creation of false or 
otherwise “inauthentic” data, and outlawing the actions that lead to data loss via 
“input, alteration, deletion, or suppression of computer data” or “any interference 
with the functioning of a computer system.”207 Further, the Convention requires 
States Party to criminalize the creation of tools that could be used to unlawfully 
access or interfere with systems or data.208 
In order to rise to a criminal level, the Convention makes clear that these 
offenses must be committed intentionally and “without right”—that is, without 
authorization or outside the parameters of legal defenses acceptable within a State 
Party’s domestic legal system.209 The Convention also provides some clarity on the 
jurisdictional ambiguities existing in cyberspace. It requires States Party to 
establish, via domestic legislation or other measures, that each State Party has 
jurisdiction over offenses committed in its territory, onboard a ship flying its flag, 
or onboard an aircraft registered under its laws.210 States Party must further 
establish jurisdiction over offenses committed by one of a State Party’s nationals 
if the offense was committed somewhere that criminalizes the underlying conduct 
or somewhere outside any State Party’s territorial jurisdiction.211 This is done via 
the passage and implementation of domestic legislation in that State Party.212 
Applying the law as set forth in the Budapest Convention to the spectrum 
of cyber defenses laid out in Section III of this Comment clarifies when active 
cyber defense measures are considered cybercrimes under international law. This 
Comment proposes using a “stoplight framework” to categorize various actions. 
That is, defenders should freely implement certain measures (green light), should 
use caution when considering more ambiguous ones (yellow light), and should 
never undertake others (red light). 
Understanding where the line is drawn between legal and illegal conduct in 
cyberspace permits cyber defenders to have a general sense of what is and is not 
permissible when putting together defense strategies. The ultimate test, however, 
as to whether a particular tactic is illegal under international law is whether it rises 
to the level of an offense that the Budapest Convention seeks to criminalize. 
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The stoplight framework proposed in this Comment easily maps on to the 
three categories of actions—passive, active-passive, and active—based upon the 
number of Budapest Convention offenses potentially implicated in each category. 
As is explained in greater detail below, defenders can confidently employ passive 
measures, ought to approach active-passive measures with caution, and should 
refrain from using active measures in order to avoid engaging in conduct that is 
illegal under international law. 
A. Passive Cyber Defense Measures: Proceed with Confidence 
In general, defensive measures in the passive category will be permissible. 
Defenses in the passive category could run afoul of only a few Convention 
offenses: illegal interception of data, data interference, or misuse of devices.213   
Measures that fall into this category include the use of antivirus software, the 
construction of firewalls, server segmentation and air-gapping,214 and engaging in 
basic cyber awareness activities like password protection and wariness in opening 
emails.215 They may also include, for example, blocking incoming traffic to one’s 
network or utilizing notification beacons that alert administrators to any attempts 
to tamper with or remove files.216 
Considering that such defenses involve little to no ongoing engagement by 
cyber defenders and generally are only deployed within the defender’s own 
network, the likelihood that they would constitute offenses defined by the 
Budapest Convention is minimal. If they were to rise to the level of a potential 
violation, the only offenses that would likely be implicated are the illegal 
interception of data, data interference, or misuse of devices. 
One can imagine a scenario in which passively surveilling intruder 
communications could constitute an illegal interception of data, because this 
behavior is roughly analogous to the “cyber wiretaps” the Convention’s drafters 
sought to prevent.217 However, this scenario seems highly unlikely because, under 
the Budapest Convention, the illegal interception offense appears to require  the 
offender to have accessed another computer system in order to be guilty of 
committing that crime.218 Monitoring one’s own system and the communications 
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on it—even if those communications take place between intruders—would seem 
not to meet that threshold. 
Similarly, although these measures might result in the suppression of 
computer data, thereby implicating the data interference offense, they likely would 
not constitute a true violation. The Explanatory Report clarified that the 
suppression offense is meant to target actions that prevent people who “ha[ve] 
access” to the computer containing the data at issue.219 While a hacker might 
technically have “access,” such access likely is not legitimate—suggesting that 
using passive defense actions does not actually violate this provision. Finally, the 
misuse-of-devicesdevice-misuse offense is mainly implicated only insofar as such 
devices are used to achieve illegal interception or interference with data.220 If 
neither of those offenses is committed, a device-misuse offense is likely not 
committed either. 
Accordingly, actions in the passive category get a green light. Because of the 
extremely low likelihood that they would be considered “offenses” as defined in 
the Budapest Convention, defenders can generally employ them without concerns 
about their illegality under international criminal law. 
B. Active-Passive Cyber Defense Measures: Proceed 
with Caution 
By contrast, tactics in the active-passive category are more likely to implicate 
a greater number of Budapest Convention offenses—nearly all of the offenses 
discussed in this Comment, in fact. Although active-passive measures are unlikely 
to result in computer-related fraud, they may well lead to illegal access to computer 
systems, illegal interception of transmissions, data interference, system 
interference, misuse of devices, or computer-related forgery. 
This category includes measures that track data taken from networks, 221 
identify and remove network intruders and lead adversaries to decoy networks, as 
well as efforts to investigate and attribute intrusions.222 
On its face, the Convention seems very clear: unauthorized access to or 
interference with systems or data is strictly prohibited.223 Under such a reading of 
the Convention, any access to an external system without the prior agreement of 
its owner appears to constitute a crime under international law. Consider, for 
example, a honeypot that deployed a virus back to visitors’ networks. Infecting 
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another network with malware would constitute illegal access to that system, at 
the very least. More violations could ensue, depending on how the malware was 
built, what virus or code it delivered to the new system, and how the virus or code 
functioned in the new environment. 
The Explanatory Report, however, indicates three potential caveats to this 
conclusion. The first is the Report’s intimation that actions falling within the ambit 
of a domestic justification for committing a crime—like necessity, self-defense, or 
consent—are permissible.224 The second is the Report’s clarification that the 
Convention did not intend to criminalize common commercial practices, and 
indeed considered such practices to occur “with right.”225 Finally, at least with 
regard to the system interference offense, the Report suggested that States Party 
are permitted to define some minimum amount of damage that must take place 
before an intrusion is considered an “interference” under the Convention.226 
These caveats open three possible avenues for the use of active-passive 
defenses. First, an entity may lawfully access the intruder’s system under the 
domestic legal conceptions of self-defense or necessity in that entity’s 
jurisdiction.227 To be clear, the ability to invoke either defense would depend on 
meeting the standards required by the domestic law of the State Party prosecuting 
the violation. This is a function of the Budapest Convention’s structure—the 
Convention requires States Party to criminalize certain conduct within their 
respective domestic laws.228 Generally, these defenses are raised in response to 
criminal prosecution. Because the Convention depends on domestic law as an 
enforcement mechanism, there will almost certainly be some variation in when 
and how these principles may be invoked. However, they may be an available 
defense, depending on an entity’s circumstances. 
The second possible avenue for implementing active-passive measures is 
within existing commercial and industry practice. One could argue that, as 
governments prove less and less willing to assume defense responsibilities for 
private companies, an “industry practice” of active-passive cyber defense is in the 
early stages of emerging.229 Indeed, the concept of active cyber defense has been 
under discussion in the industry for nearly two decades. In 1999, a web service 
company hosting the World Trade Organization’s servers defended itself against 
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a denial of service attack by reflecting the incoming traffic back at its source.230 
This would be an active defense measure under any definition. Later, in 2004, 
Symbiot Inc. made a product that could “execute appropriate countermeasures” 
against a cyber threat and would even provide a graded range of response levels 
that could be matched to the level of the attack.231 
More recently, private sector entities around the world have been responding 
to the uptick in cyberattacks by implementing some forms of active cyber defense, 
and many entrepreneurs have been very willing to assist.232 Increasing numbers of 
cybersecurity professionals advertise active-passive defense measures, like 
honeypots.233 Some companies even outsource their active cyber defenses when 
such measures would not be legal under the domestic law of their own country.234 
The financial sector, in particular, is motivated to innovate, as it faces “the 
most severe and persistent threats.”235 For example, an entire “stealth market” in 
the Netherlands exists to enable banks and other financial services companies to 
hire others to target their attackers’ servers.236 Some governments even seem open 
to the idea of private sector active defense; for example, the United Kingdom 
included in its National Cyber Security Strategy 2016–2021 a statement that it “will 
draw on its capabilities and those of industry to develop and apply active cyber 
defense measures to significantly enhance the levels of cyber security across UK 
networks.”237 
Clearly, a “gray market”—not quite a legitimate market, but not fully a black 
market, either—for active cyber defense measures is growing, aided and abetted 
by the legal ambiguities in this area.238 This could satisfy the requirement of an 
existing “industry practice” of active self-help measures that could potentially 
justify limited active-passive actions taken to investigate and attribute a cyber 
intrusion.239 
Finally, the Convention leaves the door open for States Party to establish 
some minimum amount of damage that must occur before criminal liability will 
attach for a system interference.240 Depending on the State Party from whence the 
cyber intrusion originated, this could create space for some minimal investigation 
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on the part of the targeted entity for the purposes of determining the intrusion’s 
source. However, it would be difficult to undertake such an investigation with a 
particularly high level of confidence, as the constraints on activities would vary by 
State Party. This freedom for States Party to establish threshold damage levels 
could be a useful tool for signaling their attitude towards domestic cyber actors to 
the international community. Those states wishing to disincentivize entities within 
their jurisdiction from undertaking cyberattacks could set a very high bar for the 
minimum amount of damage that must occur before criminal liability will attach—
thereby permitting more extensive investigation and activity on the part of 
targeted entities. On the other hand, states wishing to protect the ability of entities 
within their jurisdiction to operate unfettered in cyberspace could dramatically 
lower the bar. 
The idea that any minimal efforts to investigate cyber intrusions would 
constitute cybercrimes under international law seems ill-considered from an 
efficiency standpoint. Although such strict interpretation may have made sense 
when the Convention was drafted in the 1990s, it hardly seems in step with the 
current status of cyberspace. With tens of thousands of cyberattacks and 
intrusions targeting businesses every year,241 the idea that only national law 
enforcement can conduct any level of investigation in order to attribute the 
activities seems unwieldy at best and unworkable at worst. In light of the 
revolution the internet has undergone since the Convention’s drafting, it makes 
sense to interpret the Convention as permitting private entities to undertake some 
minimal level of investigation that does not cause damage to external servers for 
the purposes of attribution. This interpretation can be achieved via any of these 
three caveats. 
Although measures falling into the active-passive category are more likely to 
constitute an offense under the Budapest Convention, it is possible that those 
employing them would have some kind of legal defense or exception to justify 
their actions. Accordingly, such measures should be implemented with caution, 
and fall into the “yellow light” category of this Comment’s suggested stoplight 
framework. 
C. Active Cyber Defense Measures: Do Not Proceed 
Active cyber defenses are the most difficult to justify under the strictures of 
the Budapest Convention, as they can implicate every single Convention offense 
discussed in this Comment. 
Measures falling under this category can be generally summarized as 
“offensive actions undertaken with the goal of neutralizing an immediate threat 
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rather than retaliating.”242 These tactics are used on and impact external systems—
whether belonging to an attacker or a neutral third party—with the specific 
purpose of stopping a particular intrusion or attack. This means that they will 
almost certainly access and interfere with systems in direct violation of the 
Budapest Convention243 and are much more likely to actually damage networks 
and systems falling under another State Party’s jurisdiction than, for example, 
purely investigative measures would be. 
As a result, these measures have a hard time fitting into any of the three 
available justifications for the employment of measures external to one’s own 
network. The self-defense and necessity justifications might remain available to an 
entity in the case of an exceptionally serious cyberattack; however, an attack of 
that magnitude is precisely when national law enforcement authorities would likely 
get involved.244 The “common commercial practice” justification is likely not 
sufficiently strong to excuse outright external attacks; indeed, a 2012 survey 
conducted at the Black Hat USA cybersecurity conference “found that 36% of 
respondents claimed to have engaged in retaliatory hacking.”245 This is probably 
not deeply rooted enough to constitute a “common commercial practice” for the 
purposes of purely active measures. Finally, unless a Party has set an incredibly 
high bar domestically for the damage required to establish system interference, an 
outright active measure is far more likely to exceed this threshold. Its purpose is 
to bring an end to an intrusion or an attack; therefore, it is, in a sense, created to 
cause damage. 
Thus, with active measures, the number of potential offenses implicated is 
not offset by the availability of legal defenses. Accordingly, they belong in the “red 
light” category—that is, cyber defenders ought to refrain from using them. These 
actions are very likely to constitute illegal conduct under international law. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Budapest Convention is the only binding international law defining 
which actions are permissible in cyberspace and which are not. It is imperfect, and 
suffers from the failures of imagination that characterize late twentieth century 
attempts to regulate the internet. However, it is the international community’s 
only definition of when behavior in cyberspace becomes criminal and what 
justifications might be relied upon to excuse certain actions. Essentially any 
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unauthorized access to, or interference with, computer systems or data is 
criminalized under the Convention if it does not fall into three categories of 
exceptions: a legal defense recognized under domestic law, a common commercial 
practice, or an action that falls below the threshold set by individual States Party. 
Purely passive measures are highly unlikely to implicate any offense listed in 
the Convention, as they never venture outside the confines of an entity’s own 
network. Active-passive measures, or those that are internal to a network with 
possible external repercussions, can fall under the umbrella of one of the 
Convention’s justifications. Finally, although it is possible that an attack would be 
so egregious that a purely active measure specifically targeting external networks 
would be justified, this scenario is highly unlikely. Therefore, active measures are 
nearly always unlawful under international law and should be avoided. 
It is difficult to blame private companies for wanting to innovate when it 
comes to defending their assets in cyberspace. They face an unprecedented threat 
environment, with tens of thousands of cyberattacks directed at businesses each 
year.246 As they scramble to defend themselves, intruders claim significant 
victories, whether by stealing personal data, humiliating a company’s employees 
by releasing their emails, or even gaining a foothold into nuclear power systems 
critical for national security. The stakes of cyber defense are extremely high, and 
the Budapest Convention ought to be interpreted accordingly. 
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